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V. Containment and Reciprocity in 
Biological Systems: A Putative 
Psychophysical Organising Principle 
Jonathan Delafield-Butt 
1. Introduction 
The stuff of life, the living substance that is common to all biological 
organisms, is the aqueous society of biochemical activity ongoing in every 
cell in every living body. The basic biochemical ‘reactions’ of life are 
largely similar with variations of a theme played out in different cells living 
in different environment, e.g. the core biochemical metabolic processes of 
all life likely stem from an ancient, early-earth ancestor (Smith & 
Morowitz, 2004). However, even more common to life than shared 
biochemistry are the basic structural properties of all cells and all living 
organisms into complexes of compartmentalised units. In this paper, I will 
argue there are common feelings driving the generation of these ubiquitous 
structures in nature and that these feelings may constitute one of several 
primary forms of feeling in living systems. 
The panexperiential process philosophy, exemplified by Whitehead’s 
“Philosophy of Organism” (Whitehead, 1929), shifts the typical 
mechanism-driven theoretical framework to allow common principles of 
enacted self-organisation to come forward as driving forces behind 
biological organisation (e.g. Agar, 1936). It casts new light on what is 
occurring at the molecular, cellular, intra-, and inter-organismic levels to 
show common principles of process, or activity based on feeling, are 
occurring at each one (Agar, 1943; Birch, 1999). Biological organisation is 
similar to non-linear physical organisation where motifs are found repeated 
through many magnitudes of scale (West & Brown, 2005). However, 
biological organisation is also quite different. It is a self-generated activity 
of the parts that contributes to the formation of the whole—in significant 
quantities from trapped or collected resources—that does not happen in the 
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purely physical systems. These patterns are ‘living’ patterns in flesh and 
blood of the type that we experience and that basic organisms may 
experience, too. It is the living patterns we are closely familiar with and 
that we drive into being through our actions dependent on the presence of 
primitive ‘instincts’, or feelings, arising during specific, usually social, 
contexts.1 It is these feelings that I want to bring out here, to show that one 
set of them can generate the most common organisations seen in biology, 
contained systems. This set of feelings appears to drive the activities of 
basic living systems and so they appear to be fundamental and ubiquitous. 
2. Feeling Feeling Feeling 
Process thought emphasises feeling as being the primary ‘stuff’ of process 
and therefore the primary ‘stuff’ of the universe [PR 172]. Feelings 
contribute to the prehensions and to the guidance of the actual occasion to 
satisfaction (PR 19 [29]; Delafield-Butt, 2008). This “lure for feeling is the 
germ of mind” (PR 85 [131]). Actually, feeling is all there really is. Leue 
(2005) sums it up best, describing each actual occasion as “feeling feeling 
feeling.” In other words, an ‘organism’ is a feeling feeling another feeling 
(subject, transitive verb, object). 
If ‘feeling feeling feeling’ is at the heart of the material processes of life, 
then this suggests a new framework for biological processes based on the 
evolution and manifold expression of this basic processural system. But 
what are these feelings and how are they common among the different 
scalar layers of biological organisation? The process ‘feeling feeling 
feeling’ must share common principles reflected throughout biological 
organisation and that have evolved to give different expressions of the 
same fundamental process, just as different anatomical or genetic 
arrangements have evolved to serve specific purposes in specific contexts 
yet have developed from a common root to serve the basic life processes of 
the organism. What are these feelings and how do they express themselves 
in nature? 
3. Universal Forms of Feeling 
If feelings operate not only in human relations, but are ubiquitously present 
in all relations between ‘organisms’, as the primary stuff of actual 
occasions, then some of the same feelings that structure and shape our 
human relations may also be present in the structuring and shaping of 
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biological systems generally. These feelings common to nature and to man 
must be fundamental feelings in our human experience of them, and not 
just species-specific ones (see, e.g. Birch, 1995). I think, and will present 
here, that one set of these feelings are the feelings that underpin the quality 
of form of relating between two intimate individuals. To describe these 
feelings phenomonologically is very difficult because of their fundamental 
nature. Such a study of these experiences may be a useful approach for the 
future. Here however, I want to identify one set of them and look at what 
we can know of them through their rational study in two disciplines that 
recognise the importance of feeling in living, ecological developmental 
psychology and psychoanalytic theory. 
Both of these disciplines have examined the psychobiological nature of 
the mother-infant relationship. It is here where psychoemotional 
experiences interact so very closely with vital physiological process, 
providing us with informative material to consider how felt experience and 
the vital biological processes of living interact. In the interactions of the 
infant with adult others, our analytical adult minds can begin to see, and 
thus begin to appreciate, how feelings drive us to engagements with others 
and to steer our course of actions through them, thus shaping our behaviour 
and giving structure to our lives. 
4. Reciprocity and Containment in Human 
Relations 
In an engagement between two intimate humans, feelings form their 
binding togetherness. These feelings are generated by, and generate 
‘containment’ and ‘reciprocity’. They are based on contingencies of feeling 
between the two to form a fit that brings them together into a dyadic whole. 
Importantly, if this relation is capable of containment, then it is capable of 
enduring hardship and extremes of feeling. Containments and reciprocities 
are expressed in activity in the interaction, and so they manifest in a 
physical, bodily reality, but it is the containment and reciprocity of feeling 
that is the substance of the engagement and the driver of the activity (Stern, 
2004). 
Containment and reciprocity lie at the two ends of a continuum of relating 
(Douglas, 2007). Reciprocal engagements form a shared patterning in the 
interaction, usually with a rhythmic balance of give and receive where one 
expresses then receives the expression of the other, reciprocates in 
expression, and so on (Stern, 1971; Trevarthen, 1977; Trevarthen, 1998). 
When the dynamic of the sharing becomes stretched when one individual is 
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suffering in intense feelings, especially those that are not manageable by 
the individual alone, then in a reciprocal engagement, the other acts to 
‘contain’ the intensity of those feelings (Bion, 1959; Bion, 1962). The 
relation moves toward the container-contained end of the continuum. 
Understanding this process of relating between containment and 
reciprocity forms a major foundation for modern psychoanalytic theory. It 
is a specific mechanism by which the concerned sympathy of one person is 
able to comfort, protect, and help the other to accept, live through, and 
survive a crisis. Feelings can become too much for one person to manage 
and must be contained by another for normal life to continue. Bion (1959, 
1962) introduced the idea from his psychoanalytic work with patients, but 
drew on his observations of mother-infant interactions. Formalising the 
idea, he named the harmful extremes of feeling, ‘beta elements’, and the 
role of the other in containing these elements, the ‘alpha function’, to 
transform these into ‘alpha elements’, or manageable feelings. A container-
contained relation is formed through the projection of beta elements and 
their transformation into alpha elements by a love and a drive to stabilise, 
or make well an otherwise reciprocal and intimate relationship.  
The process is important. It forms the foundations of a developing human 
mind. It is the mechanism by which the sympathy of an intimate other is 
able to comfort and protect another during a crisis, however great or small. 
When feelings become too much for one person, they can be contained by 
another. In this form of relating, the container is one who is able to accept 
and to accommodate the stresses and traumas experienced by the other, and 
the contained is the one with psychological extremes that cannot be ‘held’ 
by oneself, but must be somehow expelled. In a container-contained 
relationship, the expulsion of the extreme is then taken up and processed in 
a novel way unfamiliar to the expeller. This processing of the extremity is 
all important, because it shows the other how to cope with this apparently 
uncopable situation. In this way, the expeller brings back into himself the 
same energy originally expelled, but transformed into an acceptable new 
form through a previously unknown mechanism. We have all experienced 
container-contained relationships and we all still live in them even in our 
so-called ‘independence’ as adults. This form of relating is particularly 
noticeable in intimate relationships where the contained and containing 
element is especially deep, but these relations also exist more superficially 
in our everyday engagements, too, and form looser dynamics of 
professional companionship and friendship.  
The idea of containment in psychoanalytic theory is one of its most 
prominent contemporary ideas, because it lends itself as a pragmatic tool 
when understanding the patient-analyst relationship. The system is 
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superficially similar to feed-back regulation, but the energies transmitted 
are feeling qualities and the one who feeds back does so by psychologically 
processing the energies of the other in order to give them back in an 
acceptable form. The patient-analyst relationship acts as a ‘container-
contained’ relationship and its unique form enables the patient to revisit his 
or her early structures of containment formed during the first parent-infant 
and parent-child relations. These early relations are of importance for one’s 
healthy or unhealthy psychological development. 
5. Dynamic Forms of Reciprocity and Engagement 
In an engagement with another, there is a patterned exchange of activity, all 
of which is communicative. Repeated cycles of reciprocated actions form 
the hallmark of a communicative engagement and set the foundation for 
language (Malloch & Trevarthen, 2008). In early mother-infant 
communication, these cycles of reciprocated activity form the bond of 
attachment. They generate strong affective feelings as well as a dyadic state 
of co-consciousness (Tronick, 2005). They take place in multiple 
modalities, including the voice, touch, and gesture, to express and to 
communicate internal feelings in reciprocal relation with those of the other. 
The engagement of the two organisms is an engagement of two feelings 
forming a common, coherent whole. In infant development, sympathetic 
sharing in the resulting dyadic state of consciousness is required for the 
healthy development of both parties, infant and mother. In a developing 
psychopathology, the reciprocity fails leading to distress, anxiety, and 
eventual developmental trauma (Reddy, 2008). 
It is the sharing, the ‘togetherness’, that brings satisfaction and health 
(Trevarthen, 1977). These rhythmic infant-adult episodes of mutual 
engagements of feelings occur through time in narrative patterns that open, 
then build, and climax before closing (Malloch, 1999). Importantly, the 
communication and narrative sequence is regulated by, and regulates 
autonomic physiological processes essential to vital health (Trevarthen, 
Aitken, Nagy, Delafield-Butt, & Vandekerckhove, 2006). There occurs a 
mutual regulation of visceral physiology, as well as a mutual regulation of 
feeling. The feeling and the physiology are entwined, so to speak, between 
two organisms in intimate engagement. 
The coming together of two is represented by the term amphoteronomics, 
coined to signify the reciprocal phenomenon of ‘ruling together’, and is 
closely related to, though distinguished from the traditional autonomic 
processes of self-regulation (Trevarthen et al., 2006). Mutual co-regulation 
138 Jonathan Delafield-Butt 
of affect and physiology appears central to a human sympathy of motives 
that generates the prospective function of the whole ‘self as agent’ who, 
with specialised sensory capacities, picks up information as perceptual 
‘affordances’ (Gibson, 1977) to guide, check and correct movements of the 
body and its parts so they will as one integrated system, attain their 
intended goals effectively and efficiently (Brazelton, 1974). 
In sum, reciprocity can be generalised from mother-infant research to be 
defined as “the sophisticated interactions between [two organisms] when 
both are involved in the initiation, regulation, and termination of the 
interaction. Reciprocity applies to the interactions in all relationships” 
(Douglas, 2007). In contrast, loneliness is, in a psychological reality, one of 
the most powerful ways that we cab know death. The fear of death is rather 
an expression of the fear of loneliness, a fear of the lack of reciprocal 
relating and thus a dearth of living satisfaction. 
6. Reciprocity as a Route to Satisfaction 
Whitehead’s notion that the actual occasion aims to achieve ‘satisfaction’ 
(Whitehead 1929) is an intriguing, but unclear idea. What is ‘satisfying’, 
exactly? I have been puzzled by whether in a spiritual sense it is simply 
satisfying ‘to be’, ‘to exist’, and that that is enough. Or if, in fact, there is 
something more tangible about a satisfaction. Whitehead’s metaphysical 
scholarship defines a satisfaction as an increase in ‘contrasts’, or in 
‘intensities of feeling’. If we consider again the process of relating and 
bring these ideas to mind, we see in the infant-adult dyad the sharing of 
feeling can amplify the feelings, bringing great joy. 
Joy is the product of a mutual regulation of social exchange by both 
partners. Smiling back and forth is the prototypical example; it usually 
begins at a relatively low level of intensity. Each partner then 
progressively escalates—kicking the other into higher orbit, so to 
speak. The exchange occurs in overlapping waves, where the mother’s 
smile elicits the infant’s, reanimating her next smile at an even higher 
level, and so on. These overlapping waves build in intensity, until, 
most often, simultaneous mutual hilarity breaks out. (Stern, 1990) 
Importantly, Stern brings us through the behavioural expressions of affect 
to look at affect communicating with affect, feeling feeling feeling, rather 
than behaviour sensing behaviour.  
Reciprocal relations generate a shared consciousness that has at its core a 
feeling of satisfaction. These feelings can be known though our own human 
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dynamic of reciprocally relating and the phenomenology of this process of 
relating may be known through sensitive introspection. Their fundamental 
character and their essential importance in generating healthy 
psychoemotional foundations in humans suggests the feelings found in this 
reciprocal processural form, and the structure of that processural form, are 
strong candidates for universals applicable to all so-called ‘organisms’. 
7. Biochemistry, Cells, Organisms and the Actual 
Occasion 
An understanding of biological systems driven by feeling requires the 
notion that even the most fundamental particles, or entities, of the natural 
world, the molecules that make up our cells, have within them small 
powers of self-willed action (Basile, 2008). It is on the back of Whitehead 
that, for example, the feelings that generate the containments we 
experience and act out as developing and adult humans are not merely 
human ones, but biologically universal feelings. 
An ‘organism’ is what Whitehead calls an ‘actual occasion’ or an ‘actual 
entity’. For the purposes of pragmatism, we can consider at the most basic 
level that an atom or a molecule is an organism with some possibility to 
enact its wilful action to achieve satisfaction; any entity is one that acts 
with a degree of unity. A macromolecular complex, for example, is an 
organism in an intracellular societal context, or a tightly bound collection 
of molecules in a cellular organelle may be an organism, or a cell may be 
an organism. Working up still further, cell systems are organisms and 
whole complexes of cells acting with unity are organisms. From the level 
of the cell upward, no biologist would disagree that this is the case; we only 
come into more controversial realms when we consider subcellular and 
molecular systems as ‘organisms’. The power of Whitehead’s philosophy 
removes these traditional barriers of thought and allows for conceptions of 
cellular and intra-cellular processes of felt experience by the entities that 
make them up, what we typically call molecules, proteins, etc. 
Further, the containing relationship does something peculiar. It creates a 
sense of an interior where there was none previously. Between two 
individuals there is no physical interior, but within both an effective 
reciprocating relation and a containing container-contained relation, a felt 
sense of ‘interior’ develops, or co-consciousness. This can manifest itself in 
the physical domain, but in a manner that is not entirely obvious at first. 
The containing relationship prevents certain actions and affords certain 
others through the change in internal feelings of each party, and also 
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sometimes through direct or indirect physical intervention. The reciprocal 
relating creates a new world of possibility. 
8. Reciprocity and Containment in Biological 
Systems 
In biological systems, reciprocal relations between parts are ubiquitous. For 
example, reciprocal relations between biochemicals form the basis of 
metabolic cycles (Smith & Morowitz, 2004), signalling complexes (Muller, 
Obeyesekere, Mills, & Ram, 2008), genetic regulation (Nelson & Bissell, 
2006), neuro-hormonal systems (Nelson & Bissell, 2006), developmental 
systems (Oyama, Griffiths, & Gray, 2003), physiology (Bernard, 1865) etc. 
There is no biological system that is not engaged in a reciprocated 
exchange with another, nor is there one that is not made up of reciprocal 
relations between its parts. Reciprocated exchange forms the basis of so-
called equilibriums (Kirkwood & Oppenheim, 1961) between chemical 
systems and so-called homeostasis (Cannon, 1929; Cannon, 1932) in 
‘living’ systems, such as protozoans or metazoans. 
From the very process of conception through to the mature physiological 
functions of an adult, the organism is built on reciprocal inter-relations 
between specialised and complementary parts. Additionally, its self-driven 
activity in its social and object environment remains embedded in 
reciprocal relations with others, in this case made by the totality of the 
organisms acting in its world (Reed, 1996). Physical containment of these 
processes is also ubiquitous. Biological organisation is based on 
compartmentalised specialisms, each compartment contains a set of 
biological activity (e.g. biochemical activity, specialised cell function) that 
would otherwise not be able to endure without the protection of the 
containment. The difference between biological compartmentalisation and 
psychological inter-personal containment is obvious, the former is 
composed of biological material while the latter is composed of volitional 
action driven by feelings of sympathetic attunement, or love. However, the 
difference is not as clear-cut as it first seems and I believe that in these 
differences and similarities lie some clues to the nature of feelings in 
biological organisations. 
If there is even an iota of joie de vivre present in the interactions of 
molecules, then there will be cause to preserve this feeling. The first 
molecular arrangements that generated the origins of life are cyclic, or 
reciprocal. These make up the modern prokaryote thermo- and 
mycoplasmas constructed of three coupled cycles of biochemical activity 
 The Philosophy of an Infinite, Open and Integrated Universe 141 
forming sustainable relations through their reciprocal inter-relating. “The 
existence and co-operation of these three subsystems is the prior condition 
for the presence of life” (Gániti, 1971). One feeds into the other and the 
other feeds back to the first, and so on ad infinitum. Ad infinitum, that is, 
until some other molecular entity or energy extreme comes crashing in and 
disrupts the system, destabilising and ruining it. In order to preserve the 
fragility of the molecular arrangement, protection must be established. One 
protection is the first ‘compartmentalisation’, one of Gániti’s prokaryotic 
subsystems, the first membrane to surround the cyclical molecular system 
to preserve and protect it. However, in a panexperiential world-view, no 
entity is inert and passive. The molecular system that makes up the 
membrane must itself be contributing to a set of relations that provides a 
sense of satisfaction. 
This is important, and possible through two means. Either the immediate 
set of relations provides a sense of satisfaction by placing two entities in a 
stable relation, or the entities generate a sense of satisfaction by 
contributing to a greater whole, the entire complex of entities that make up 
the stable set, the primitive cell. I think it is likely to be both, that there is 
an intense satisfaction in the immediate set of relations and another quality 
of satisfaction in the generation of a greater whole. This question is really 
one of what contributes to any one actual occasion and how the degrees of 
physical (coordinate) separation or functional (genetic) intimacy 
correspond to degrees of prehensive intensity in any one occasion. In other 
words, a question best addressed at length elsewhere. 
The most primitive containment, the phospholipid bilayer membrane, is 
ubiquitous in cellular life. In fact, it characterises cellular life. The 
membrane is compose of two layers that are identical and surround the cell, 
giving the cell its boundary, its ‘skin’, and the regulatory apparatus 
allowing life-sustaining material in and keeping life-threatening material 
out (Nagle & Tristam-Nagle, 2000; Tristam-Nagle & Nagle, 2004). The 
molecular unit of the lipid bilayer membrane is the lipid. The membrane is 
composed of hundreds of millions of individual lipids, each one nearly 
similar to the next. The membrane becomes arranged because of the 
electrostatic properties of the lipids. Each lipid has an electrically charged 
head and two parallel electrically neutral tails. The medium of living 
biochemical organisation is water—our bodies are greater than sixty 
percent water. Water is electrically charged. Thus, the lipids arrange 
themselves so that their charged heads interact with the water and their tails 
then try to move as far away from the water as far as possible. A bilayer is 
one solution. 
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Each lipid within the phospholipid bilayer membrane works to physically 
contain the entire inside of the cell through its interactions with its 
neighbouring lipids and water solutions. By its position in the membrane 
structure, it immanently produces that structure through the satisfaction of 
its own immediate relations, and thereby engages in and contributes to the 
process of ‘physical’ containment. In satisfying those immediate relations, 
therefore, it contributes its vital part in preserving and therefore satisfying 
the greater whole. How does it satisfy its own, immediate relations? It does 
so through a dynamic chemical process of balancing electrostatic charges. 
It must ‘work’ with its neighbour to find a stable balance of relations, and 
in this case doing so creates an organisation we call the lipid bilayer 
membrane, made from the resulting arrangement of electrostatic properties 
along its tail and head. 
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, how can we now account for 
reciprocity and containment in the individual molecular interactions? The 
same manifestation of containment and reciprocity that we witness in the 
infant-parent dyad and whose feelings we can come to know through 
analytic retro- and intro-spection of our own experience may be present in 
the interactions between two phospholipids in a cellular bilayer membrane. 
The same patterns of relating are apparent. The dynamic of electromagnetic 
charge interaction is one of reciprocal inter-relations that take place via 
‘discreetised’ quanta of activity (Feynmann, 1985; Oppenheimer, 1931), 
analogous to those quanta of activity that make up any one gesture in a 
narrative of gestures in a parent-infant engagement. That is, I propose each 
lipid molecule is able to direct the placement and interaction of its electric 
charge in such a way that it resembles the direction and placement of limbs, 
voice, and body in our active engagement in interaction. That is to say that 
in molecular engagements, the most comparable apparatus to our effectors 
(hands, feet, voice etc.) are the outer electron shells (these are the most 
distal atomic components and the ones that interact most directly with 
others) and so it may be with these apparatus that an atomic organism may 
enact its iota of ‘will’. The phospholipids form stable relations between 
each other by balancing their charges to produce satisfactory 
hydrophobicity and hydrophilicity of its regions with that of its 
environment, the charges and neutralities of its neighbours. 
This arrangement maintains itself in calm, benign conditions through this 
type of reciprocal electrostatic dynamic, forming a stable balance and so an 
enduring relation. It is when a perturbation to this relation occurs that the 
relation is pushed from being in reciprocated balance to being under threat, 
or pushed to an extreme. Accommodation of the disturbance must be made. 
As one phospholipid moves out of position with the other, both experience 
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higher energy feelings that have an inherent ‘pull’ to which they respond 
by resuming their former position. The dynamic both in spatial and in 
energic terms creates a relational ‘well’ of stability, what dynamic 
equilibrium theory calls a low energy basin. It is the inherent ability of one 
individual lipid to appropriate the increased (c.f. traumatic) energy of its 
companion lipid, to ‘process’ this additional energy, and to give it back to 
the other in a new, beneficial form that closely parallels the larger form of 
human psychological containment. 
In the lipids’ case, the containing lipid is less defined as an individual 
acting alone to contain as we might see a mother doing, and as is more 
observable as a component in a large sheet of dynamic relations. In this 
view, when the impact of high energy is felt by one part of the system, one 
lipid say, this experience is distributed over a sheet of hundreds of 
thousands of lipids. While this is observable, it occludes the fact that the 
distributions of energies comes back to the individual relations of, say, the 
impacted lipid and its neighbour. It is the arrangement of the lipids 
altogether that gives one the ability to be able to contain the up-swells of 
another. This core process-relational notion of ‘individual-in-community’ 
is an important fact not to be missed. For humans as well, it is our social 
distribution of containments and the distributions of energies that enables 
the one to contain the other. Isolated, each is bound to perish. 
9. Concluding Remarks 
If we are to believe that we can apply experience down to the individual 
‘experiences’ of molecules (Cobb, 1984; Griffin, 1988) and that experience 
holds some universal qualities present in every layer of biological 
organisation, then we have to consider how our human experience is driven 
by fundamental feeling and how these might be applicable. It has been 
shown that a process account of biochemical activity is achievable and may 
be necessary to explain the temporal course of reaction dynamics (Early, 
1981; Stein, 2006). One set of feelings are the sympathies in the reciprocal, 
attuned relation with an intimate other. Psychoanalytic work has shown that 
the feelings present in this form of relating are fundamental to our 
psychological makeup and that these feelings are primary. They are thus a 
good bet for ascribing to them universal importance in every ‘organismic’ 
relation. From a biological view, molecules form the primary ‘building 
blocks’ of our constitution. Thus, what is present in us may be present in 
them. Our experience may be applicable to them. This reasoning forms the 
basis of exploring the possibility that common feelings present in and 
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driving reciprocity and containment in human relations are also present in 
and are driving ‘reciprocal’ and ‘containing’ relations between the most 
basic entities, the molecules. 
I have given here only one infinitesimally small example of a reciprocal 
and containing relation between two seemingly insignificant lipids in a 
bilayer membrane of an anonymous cell that could be any cell in any 
organism in any part of the world. If we begin to examine this same 
structure of relating and driving engagement to form enduring relations 
through reciprocal and containing actions, then we begin to see this feature 
everywhere in nature. The biological systems positively explode with 
commonality. This can mean two things: either our definition is 
insufficiently precise to be useful, or the process is so very fundamental 
that it is ubiquitous in living systems. It may be that both are true: 
Increased resolution of the definition with precise examples by empirical 
observation and characterisation of this phenomenon will reveal in greater 
clarity the psychophysics of reciprocating and containing relations. 
Importantly, our definition of ‘organism’ must be improved, and our 
understanding of organisms as actual entities in biochemical systems must 
be enhanced (e.g. see Stein, this volume). This will give us greater 
understanding of what constitutes an ‘organism’ and what possibilities 
those, especially biochemical organisms have to enact themselves into 
satisfaction. If we can begin to identify these fundamentals, we will be 
better positioned to further examine not only reciprocity and containment 
in basic biological systems, but also the role such a putative set of feelings 
may play in creating enduring biological processive-order. 
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1 “The force that through the green fuse drives the flower 
Drives my green age; that blasts the roots of trees 
Is my destroyer. 
And I am dumb to tell the crooked rose 
My youth is bent by the same wintry fever. 
The force that drives the water through the rocks 
Drives my red blood; that dries the mouthing streams 
Turns mine to wax. 
And I am dumb to mouth unto my veins 
How at the mountain spring the same mouth sucks. 
The hand that whirls the water in the pool 
Stirs the quicksand; that ropes the blowing wind 
Hauls my shroud sail. 
And I am dumb to tell the hanging man 
How of my clay is made the hangman's lime. 
The lips of time leech to the fountain head; 
Love drips and gathers, but the fallen blood 
Shall calm her sores. 
And I am dumb to tell a weather's wind 
How time has ticked a heaven round the stars. 
And I am dumb to tell the lover's tomb 
How at my sheet goes the same crooked worm.” 
—Dylan Thomas, ca. 1934 
